{"id":239463,"date":"2025-08-19T13:54:13","date_gmt":"2025-08-19T13:54:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/239463\/"},"modified":"2025-08-19T13:54:13","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T13:54:13","slug":"was-the-jrue-holiday-trade-to-the-milwaukee-bucks-a-success-or-a-failure-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/239463\/","title":{"rendered":"Was the Jrue Holiday trade to the Milwaukee Bucks a success or a failure?"},"content":{"rendered":"

I\u2019m back for Chapter 2 of this series! If you haven\u2019t already, go back and read Chapter 1<\/a>, where I first broke down weak link theory and its application to the last three Bucks starting point guards. Then, I took the reader on a trip down memory lane to 2018 when Milwaukee became a truly dominant team, statistically analysing how they became so dominant. Finally, I discussed Eric Bledsoe\u2019s severe offensive struggles in the playoffs, which ultimately led to his ouster. In Chapter 2, I\u2019ll discuss Bledsoe\u2019s replacement, Jrue Holiday, and his offensive struggles in the postseason. I\u2019ll also statistically analyse Milwaukee\u2019s title and how it compares with other NBA champions, before finally debating if the trade for Holiday was really a success. Enjoy!<\/p>\n

Weak link #2: Jrue Holiday<\/p>\n

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Getty Images<\/p>\n

Jrue Holiday was supposed to pick up the same defensive thread that Eric Bledsoe left while providing a more efficient shooting option. Now, was Holiday more impactful than Bledsoe on the whole? It\u2019s hard to say he wasn\u2019t. Holiday\u2019s regular season stats were pretty damn good at 18.5 PPG, 6.8 APG, 4.7 RPG, and 2.0 steals\/blocks per game, while shooting 49.5% from the field and 39.5% from three on 5.3 attempts per game. At the same time, we shouldn\u2019t forget that Eric Bledsoe\u2019s regular season stats wearing Bucks green (plus the half season in Phoneix because I couldn\u2019t filter it out) weren\u2019t too shabby either: 16.3 PPG, 5.3 APG, 4.4 RPG, and 2.0 steals\/blocks per game, while shooting 47.8% from the field and 33.9% from three on 4.5 attempts per game. But the regular season was never Bledsoe\u2019s problem; the reason he was traded was because his shooting efficiency dropped precipitously in the playoffs. Well, guess what? Jrue Holiday\u2019s playoff efficiency ended up being just as bad:<\/p>\n

StatisticEric BledsoeJrue HolidayPlayoff games3140PPG13.117.9APG4.67.9RPG3.95.8SPG1.11.6TPG2.32.6FG%41.10% (11.8 attempts)39.60% (17.7 attempts)3P%25.40% (4.1 attempts)30.40% (6.6 attempts)2P%49.40% (7.8 attempts)45.10% (11.2 attempts)FT%73.20% (3.1 attempts)75.00% (2.5 attempts)TS%49.40%46.90%<\/p>\n

I understand the defensive responsibilities Bledsoe and Holiday took on in the postseason, but that can\u2019t be the sole reason for this level of poor shooting. I think it\u2019s fair to conclude that had both starting point guards shot more efficiently when it mattered most, the butterfly effect could have been substantial when considering how dominant those Bucks teams were in most other areas. At the same time, it\u2019s worth acknowledging that Horst acquired Holiday to be an offensive improvement from Bledsoe in these key moments, and he did not live up to that, period.<\/p>\n

I even became curious and isolated Jrue\u2019s three-point shooting (just to look at one shot distance) to see if there was some key difference in the type of threes he was taking between the regular season and the playoffs that might help to explain this drop-off; the answer is no, there really wasn\u2019t. For example, during the 2020-21 regular season, Holiday shot 37.9% on catch-and-shoot threes with a 14.1% shot frequency; in the playoffs of that same season, he shot 31.5% with a 13.9% frequency. The same shot and (virtually) same shot frequency, and the percentage declined a fair amount in the playoffs. Of course, there\u2019s always the fatigue angle with core guys playing more minutes in the postseason, but that applies to every team.<\/p>\n

Therefore, I wondered: Although most fans (me included) instinctively look back on the Holiday trade and view it as a success because the Bucks won a title\u2014and as Brian Windhorst\u2019s famous saying goes, \u201cwhen you win, it means never having to say you\u2019re sorry\u201d\u2014are we sure the trade elevated the team to the level of a champion? Or, is it more likely that the 2020-21 team\u2014while continuing to play the same dominant brand of basketball that continually put Milwaukee, at the very least, in the championship conversation\u2014caught some breaks other Bucks teams may not have during some of the previous (and following) postseasons, and won a title, which masks the fact that this \u201cblockbuster trade\u201d actually wasn\u2019t all that additive? And to be clear, I think there were some material differences in the title team, particularly in mental fortitude and strategy, that differentiated it from teams prior; winning a \u2018chip obviously can\u2019t be reduced to \u201ccatching breaks.\u201d My point, however, is that it\u2019s up for debate how much Jrue impacted these differences. Let\u2019s investigate.<\/p>\n

Analysing Milwaukee\u2019s title (and Jrue Holiday\u2019s role in it)<\/p>\n

\"NBA:<\/a><\/p>\n

Michael McLoone-USA TODAY Sports<\/p>\n

As the table below shows, Milwaukee won the title in 2020-21 with a statistical profile far less impressive than that of the 2018-19 season\u2014both in the regular season and the playoffs\u2014reinforcing the sense that the team\u2019s inability to beat the Raptors may haunt them as a significant missed opportunity. Elsewhere, the regular season profile of the 2019-20 season sticks out on this table; that team was dominating before Covid halted the season. They ended that shortened regular season with a 56-17 (!) record. On the other hand, the playoff profile of that team, although it appears similar to the previous season\u2019s playoff profile on paper, is less credible because the sample size is substantially reduced (five-game loss in the second round). Man, it still would\u2019ve been nice to see that team play in front of real fans, though. Granted, it\u2019s certainly no guarantee that the Bucks would have beaten the Heat, who went all the way to the \u201cbubble\u201d NBA Finals, in a typical environment, especially seeing as they lost in a gentleman\u2019s sweep.<\/p>\n

SeasonOffence (RS)Defence (RS)Offence (PS)Defence (PS)2020-21 (Holiday)116.5 (5th)110.7 (9th)112.2 (11th)106.8 (1st)2019-20 (Bledsoe)111.9 (8th)102.5 (1st)109.1 (8th)107.3 (4th)2018-19 (Bledsoe)113.5 (4th)104.9 (1st)110.7 (4th)101.9 (1st)<\/p>\n

With all of that in mind, the question that might dawn on you is, \u201cdid the Bucks get lucky winning that championship?\u201d More specifically, \u201cis winning the title with the top playoff defence and 11th-best offence out of the norm?\u201d The first and most obvious point to make clear is that yes, the higher a team ranks in both categories, the more their chances of winning increase. But teams can also win championships \u201con balance.\u201d What I mean by \u201con balance\u201d is that even if a team severely struggles on one end (like the Bucks did on offence in the title season), their proficiency on the other end can save them. In the 2020-21 playoffs, the Bucks were first on offence but 10 spots away from first on defence, thus 10 spots away from \u201cperfect.\u201d This is comparable to the Raptors in the 2018-19 playoffs being six spots away from first on offence and three spots away on defence, which equals nine spots away from \u201cperfect.\u201d<\/p>\n

Season and championOffenceDefenceSpots from \u201cperfect\u201d2024-25: Oklahoma City114.3 (5th)105.7 (1st)42023-24: Boston116.8 (4th)108.2 (3rd)52022-23: Denver118.2 (1st)110.2 (4th)32021-22: Golden State114.5 (4th)109.6 (6th)82020-21: Milwaukee112.2 (11th)106.8 (1st)102019-20: Los Angeles115.6 (2nd)108.7 (6th)62018-19: Toronto109.8 (7th)104.2 (4th)92017-18: Golden State112.7 (1st)102.0 (1st)-2016-17: Golden State118.2 (2nd)105.3 (2nd)22015-16: Cleveland114.6 (1st)105.2 (8th)7<\/p>\n

In short, Milwaukee won the championship despite a horrid playoff offence because of their elite defence. Jrue was a key reason both of those happened. Had the Bucks had, say, even the third-best defence, they likely wouldn\u2019t have won a title that year. But to answer the above question, I do not think the Bucks were \u201clucky\u201d in winning that championship. However, while that team\u2019s statistical profile was in the realm of other champions, it does appear to be at least a mild outlier that required some breaks to go their way. The reason I make that point is not to diminish the title in any way whatsoever; the \u201casterisk ring\u201d conversation is reductive and silly. I say that to make the point that winning another title with an outlier profile, by its very nature, would be highly unlikely.<\/p>\n

To win again, the team needed to move their profile towards the standard of around 4-7 spots from \u201cperfect,\u201d as the table indicates. Unfortunately, Milwaukee\u2019s statistical playoff profile moved further away (from the 10 spots from \u201cperfect\u201d that they won with in 2021) over the next two regular seasons and playoffs\u2014as the table at the bottom of this paragraph shows\u2014and accordingly, the team did not advance past the second round. Jrue continued to be an offensive weak link, shooting poorly in both campaigns.<\/p>\n

SeasonOffence (RS)Defence (RS)Offence (PS)Defence (PS)2022-23114.3 (15th)110.9 (4th)114.2 (6th)119.0 (15th)2021-22114.3 (3rd)111.1 (14th)103.4 (15th)102.7 (1st)<\/p>\n

Before this section concludes, I should acknowledge the possibility of outside factors contributing to Jrue\u2019s shooting struggles in Milwaukee, such as injuries to Khris Middleton in 2022 and Giannis Antetokounmpo in 2023, which theoretically may have expanded his role to a degree he wasn\u2019t comfortable with. At the same time, considering the stats I reference in the next section from the 2021 playoffs\u2014when the big three were healthy for (basically) the entire run and Jrue still shot very poorly\u2014I don\u2019t know how much credence to give that argument.<\/p>\n

I suppose you could argue that the way Boston dramatically shrank Jrue\u2019s offensive responsibilities, asking him to play a lot as a corner shooter and dunker-spot operator, it shows that he is capable of upping his postseason efficiency in a specific role (49.8% from the field and 38.9% from three on 5.2 attempts per game over two playoff runs). However, the Celtics were one of the few NBA teams that could realistically afford to have a player earning $30m per season be their fourth or fifth option due to 1) excellent team construction and 2) the ginormous tax bill their owners were willing to pay (for a few seasons, at least).<\/p>\n

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Getty Images<\/p>\n

As far as declaring the Holiday trade was a \u201csuccess\u201d or not, I struggle to answer definitively either way. I suppose I would call it a success on the logic that 1) the theory of how Jrue would elevate the team worked (to a certain degree) in the regular season, and 2) the trade allowed the team to maintain its defensive identity, which had proven to be a prosperous formula that had yet to translate to a title, and then it finally did. Some may think 2) is me trying too hard to flatter the front office, but I consider this extremely valuable. If I were to make my best case as to why the trade was a success, I would emphasise that acquiring Jrue didn\u2019t rock what was an incredibly smooth-sailing boat (dumb analogy, but run with me here). Now, Jrue was acquired to streamline the boat, which I don\u2019t think he did; however, there was no realistic scenario in which the boat would sink with Jrue, which, crucially, differentiates this trade from the one that followed it.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, I could entertain the idea that the trade was not a success on the logic that 1) the way Jrue shot in the playoffs, it seems entirely possible that the Bucks still would\u2019ve won that title with Bledsoe anyway, and 2) if Horst was mortgaging the future, he needed to shoot higher than Holiday for a player who he was all but certain would not bring the same issues that Bledsoe did. Granted, 2) is a very tall order. Regardless, the Bucks had a formula that continued to put them at least on the fringes of the championship conversation before they acquired Holiday\u2014the same formula that ultimately won out with Holiday on the team\u2014but the stats don\u2019t necessarily indicate that Holiday \u201ctipped the scale\u201d in a way that Bledsoe could not have.<\/p>\n

Certainly, Jrue\u2019s defence in the 2021 playoffs was elite and, it\u2019s fair to say, was probably better than Eric\u2019s in prior playoff campaigns. To what degree was it better? Well, that\u2019s always going to be difficult to measure quantitatively, at least. Eric made consecutive NBA All-Defensive teams with the Bucks in the 2018-19 and 2019-20 seasons; he was no slouch on that front. Looking at advanced stats, Holiday\u2019s defensive box plus\/minus (DBPM)\u2014defined by Basketball Reference as a box score estimate of the defensive points per 100 possessions a player contributed above a league-average player, translated to an average team\u2014in those playoffs was 1.2; Bledsoe\u2019s playoff DBPM the year prior was also 1.2. By and large, I would say both players made somewhat similar contributions on defence. That said, I can\u2019t act like I don\u2019t intuitively feel like Holiday was a notch above and, crucially, a more impactful playmaker\u2014the \u201cvalley-oop<\/a>\u201d being the most notable example of that.<\/p>\n

On offence, Holiday assisted more than Bledsoe ever did in any playoffs he was a part of with the Bucks. Jrue averaged 8.7 dimes per game in the 2021 postseason; Eric was at an average of 5.9 in the playoffs prior. It should also be mentioned that Holiday made a number of clutch shots in that playoff run. However, the facts are that Jrue shot 40.6% from the field in those playoffs and 48.2% on true shooting. Per Basketball Reference<\/a>, the average shooting percentage in those playoffs was 46.2%; the average true shooting percentage was 57.1%. Holiday just had to be better than that as the team\u2019s third-highest paid player. And yes, by the same token, I also believe that Milwaukee would\u2019ve had the same unsuccessful results in the two seasons after that with Bledsoe as well. But the key difference is that if Horst stuck with Bledsoe, the team wouldn\u2019t have been out two firsts and two swaps. Fans will never know the opportunity cost of parting ways with those picks and whether acquiring a different player than Holiday could have prevented the need for further major transactions, which then would have afforded Horst a boatload more flexibility than he has now.<\/p>\n

Check back in next week for Chapter 3, the final of this series, where I\u2019ll break down the brief Damian Lillard era in Milwaukee, analysing the logic behind the move, what the stats (and the eye test) tell us about how translatable Lillard\u2019s game truly is to winning at the highest level, the role injuries played in his two years in the Cream City, and if a trade for a \u201clesser player\u201d might have resulted in more success for Milwaukee.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"I\u2019m back for Chapter 2 of this series! If you haven\u2019t already, go back and read Chapter 1,…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":239405,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3775],"tags":[7,103,1565,102,121,3871,6],"class_list":{"0":"post-239463","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-milwaukee-bucks","8":"tag-basketball","9":"tag-bucks","10":"tag-bucks-analysis","11":"tag-milwaukee","12":"tag-milwaukee-bucks","13":"tag-milwaukeebucks","14":"tag-nba"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/channels.im\/@nba\/115055772615225381","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/239463","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=239463"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/239463\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/239405"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=239463"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=239463"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=239463"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}