The analytics movement has brought a change in strategy for when to try for a 2-point conversion in one specific situation. The idea is modern, grounded in analytics … and was used back in 1969 by Texas coach Darrell K. Royal.

The strategy: When you’re trailing by 14 points late (enough) in a game, and score a touchdown, you should go for 2 points, rather than kick an extra point.

The theory: 2-point conversions are generally a 50 percent chance. So even if you don’t get it the first time, you could make up for it the second time and tie the game. If you make the first 2-point conversion, you can win the game with the second touchdown and extra point. But if you go with the conventional wisdom and kick the extra point both times, then you’re going to overtime, which is also around a 50-50 shot.

Going for 2 is not only aggressive, but it’s smart. At least that goes the newfound analytical thinking that coaches are following, confusing those used to the traditional — and seemingly safe — strategy. They may be surprised to know it’s not actually that new.

Royal was trailing Arkansas 14-0 in the fourth quarter of a No. 1 vs. No. 2 showdown in 1969. When the Longhorns scored, Royal went for 2, and got it. Then the Longhorns scored again and won 15-14.

This was called the game of the century. President Richard Nixon was there, sitting with then-Texas Congressman George H.W. Bush. And yet Royal’s strategy was overlooked. It’s becoming more en vogue now, one of the influences of analytics and “the book,” the game management guide that more than 100 FBS programs now utilize.  Houston coach Willie Fritz recalled a meeting with the book’s authors, Championship Analytics Inc., in which they showed a tape of a coach not doing it in another long-ago big game: The 1984 Orange Bowl, the de facto national championship. Nebraska was trailing Miami 31-17, scored a touchdown, kicked the extra point, then scored again and Tom Osborne went for 2 and the win, because there was no overtime. He failed.

“It works for older coaches like me, because we remember it,” Fritz said.

The fact Royal did what analytics now say was the right move underscores their point: It’s not so much new-age thinking as it is logic.

Here are a few other strategies, some situational and some big-picture, that coaches and analysts say don’t get enough attention:

The law of diminishing possessions

When you’re losing in the second half, you need to take more risks rather than rely on field position. Say you’re down 10 with around five minutes left in the third quarter, and facing fourth down. A punt means you probably only have two or three possessions left.

That doesn’t mean you should go for it every time. But you should go for it more than the traditional thinking says. The book includes a chart that recommends what teams should do based on the score, time remaining, field position and distance to go.

“The part that’s maybe lost is the amount of possessions that really exist in a football game,” Oregon coach Dan Lanning said. “And be able to wrap your head around how many more possessions might you have, and that’s going to affect your aggression a little bit. You know you’re most likely only get the ball three more possessions, you know you need two scores, that’s going to make you more aggressive.”

The ‘sum positive’ of going for it

In 2015, the first year Fritz used the book, his Georgia Southern team began 0-for-7 on fourth downs. Rather than abandon the recommendations, he kept going and the team finished 23-for-35.

Rob Ash, the former Montana State coach who now works for CAI, put it this way: On a fourth-and-1 from your own 34, the success rate is in the 70s (depending on the team).

“We really try to get people to understand, if you have a 75 percent chance to make a fourth-and-1, and you go for it once and miss your next fourth-and-1, you still have a 75 percent chance to make it, regardless of what happened the first time,” Ash said.

Plus, Ash said the data shows that the sum positive of the 75 percent of the drives that are extended is greater than the negative derived from the 25 percent of the time you fail.

Army coach Jeff Monken said he’s found that to be the case. He’s gone for it three times on fourth-and-1 from around his own 10: Twice, Army made it. The time it didn’t, its defense got a stop and the other team missed a field goal.

When field goals are good …

The book generally makes teams more aggressive, but not always. That’s why Marcus Freeman, criticized for a decision in the 2025 national championship, still made the right move in the eyes of analytics.

Notre Dame was trailing by 16 with 9:27 left in the game against Ohio State. Facing fourth-and-goal from the 9, Freeman opted for the field goal. The Irish missed. When Notre Dame later scored a touchdown, adding a 2-point conversion to make it an 8-point game, the decision looked even worse.

But “in the eyes of analytics,” an 8-point game is not a one-possession game, Ash said, and a 16-point game is not a two-possession game, because of the odds of winning the game. The chances of getting two touchdowns and 2-point conversions, then winning in overtime, are under 10 percent.

“It was easily the right decision,” Ash said. “But everyone looked at that 16-point game as a two-possession game, and he was in the red zone, and said man he’s got to go for this.”

When field goals are bad …

Psychology matters. This gets to an example Fritz used for why he signed on to CAI.

In 2014, Fritz’s Georgia Southern team led NC State 20-17 in the final minutes and kicked a chip-shot field goal on short yardage, only to see the Wolfpack answer with a game-winning touchdown.

When you’re up 3 in the final minutes and have fourth-and-short, the analytics will always say go for it. A field goal would make it a 6-point game, and the other team, knowing it needs a touchdown, will be more aggressive and thus has a better chance of getting a touchdown, as N.C. State did.

If you go for it, you may get it, going up 10, or could at least extend the drive. Or you fail, and it’s still a 3-point lead, but the other team plays it less aggressively, knowing it can get to overtime with a field goal.

“The analytics creates a situation there that changes your opponent’s approach to the game,” Ash said.