As is true for most discussions about sports, there is no single criterion for judging the quality of a team’s NFL draft class. There are, however, a number of concepts — some actually contradictory — that get applied.
Mock drafters, in particular, tend to focus on the concept of ‘need’, by which they mean identifying and filling roster holes. A team that fills a roster hole with a draft pick is often praised for that achievement, but may be criticized for passing on better players — at least players who are more highly ranked or who are perceived as superior — who play at a different position that is not a position of need. The big fallacy here, of course, is that NFL roster needs change in an instant when injuries strike, and they strike unpredictably. Perceived needs in April may be very different from actual needs in November.
Value (picks vs consensus)
Mock drafters also place a lot of value on…well…on ‘value’. This is a concept that is often measured in relation to a ‘consensus board’, which, in these days of countless online mock drafts, is easy to find. The idea is that a player ranked, say, 50th on the consensus board would represent bad value if drafted 35th overall, fair value if drafted 51st, and good value if drafted 75th. In a perverse way, this places the wisdom of the crowd above the wisdom of the professional. This week, 49ers GM John Lynch is getting roasted for his habit of straying far from consensus board and making low value picks, while his former assistant GM and current Commanders General Manager Adam Peters is getting praise for the fact that in 2025 and 2026, he has increasingly demonstrated more commitment to the concept of value. In fact, Washington is being credited with having one of the highest (if not the highest) value drafts of this past weekend.
Given the constraints of the NFL salary cap, the positional pay scales that have developed over the years, and the defined rookie wage scale based on draft position, positional value is a concept that a GM ignores at his peril. In the leadup to this year’s draft, massive amounts of digital ‘ink’ was used up on the question of how early a team should draft running back Jeremiyah Love — not because he’s been anything less than a great player in college, but because NFL running backs tend to have shorter careers and get paid less per year. The potential salary cap advantage that comes with using an early pick on a quarterback, edge rusher, or wide receiver, for instance, is blunted when a team, instead, uses a top pick to draft a lower-value position like running back or interior offensive linemen.
Whether we’re talking about a publicly recognized draft expert like Mel Kiper or a passionate NFL fan who watches film, passionately follows the NFL Combine, and creates his own personal “big board” ahead of the draft, individuals can spend months preparing for a draft that they have no part in and over which they have no control. Those individuals can get emotional and impassioned in their support or criticism of any draft pick (or an entire slate of picks) because it differed sharply from that person’s entrenched opinion, which is based on those months of preparation.
Often seen as the opposite of ‘drafting for need’, picking the best player available (BPA) can result in leaving one or more roster holes unfilled. A team that chooses the best player available will be praised for adding a top-tier talent who may be a roster cornerstone for the next decade, but may be criticized for leaving roster holes unfilled. There are times when the BPA coincides with a team need, eliminating the conflict, but when the two do not coincide, it creates a dichotomy between the short term (need) and long term (BPA).
A ‘traits-based’ pick may focus on drafting a player who has the desired measurables (height, weight, speed) for the position he will play in the NFL. If the player lacks proven performance in college, this sort of pick may be criticized. On the other hand, it may be praised if the prospect is seen as developing or having high potential. A GM might be criticized for using an early (premium) draft pick for a player with good traits, but praised for using a late round (late Day 3) pick for a player with good traits, even when he lacks proven performance.
Some picks clearly value performance over traits. This offseason offered an archetype for this kind of pick in edge rusher Rueben Bain, whose relatively short arms will make him almost a unicorn if he produces at a high level in the NFL, yet he was seen as an early 1st-round pick by most people who watched his game tape. The argument with this sort of player revolves around the question of how early a team should take a risk by drafting him based on prioritizing his proven performance over the lack of accepted measurables for his position.
Talent is neither absolute nor static. Some players enter the NFL with a fully developed body and skillset; they may often be described as having a high floor/limited ceiling. This player may be a strong addition to a team that needs an immediate contributor — a team that is drafting for need that is looking for a ’sure thing’.
Other players enter the league with less developed bodies or skillsets, but with lots of potential for growth — both physical and in terms of knowledge and skills. These player may be seen as having low floor/high ceiling. Teams that have highly talented rosters who are drafting with an eye towards the future may be more able to take a risk on the player’s potential for future development.
I don’t think it’s unfair to suggest that a portion of NFL fans who spend time studying college film, reading extensively about players, and participating in mock drafting exercises may be more highly informed about draftable players than were the NFL executives who used to meet annually in a smoke-filled hotel ballroom with Commissioner Pete Rozelle in the 1960s to make their selections.
Fan opinions these days are highly informed, and an NFL GM who did nothing more than follow a consensus big board, or one who ‘crowdsourced’ his picks via an online vote of fans, probably wouldn’t end up with a bad result.
It’s often said that it takes at least three years to grade a draft pick or a team’s draft class. Drafted players are, by their nature, development projects. Giving immediate draft grades is a fool’s errand for many reasons, but it is one that ignites the passion of fans, whether those fans are issuing the grades or reacting to the grades assigned by others.
As should be clear from the discussion of factors — again, many of which are contradictory — above, there is not single accepted framework for evaluating draft picks, and no single method for assessing the accuracy of grades that are given.
In the end, it is a lot like most passionate sports discussions — an entertaining way for people to agree or disagree about an unprovable idea. It’s a way to spend a few minutes over a cold beer in a cozy bar with a good friend or — in the 3rd decade of the 21st century — online in the comments section of a blog with a group of quasi-acquaintances separated by space and time.
How did Hogs Haven grade the Commanders complete 2026 draft class?
Overall, the many Hogs Haven members who voted in this week’s survey had a generally positive view of Adam Peters’ decisions, with 75% of respondents giving him a grade of “A” or “B”, and only 3% giving a grade lower than “C”.
The most popular grade was a “B” (45%) and the calculated “GPA” of 2.99 also points to a solid “B” grade.
In general, the selection of Sonny Styles in the first round drew broad praise. In a similar vein to the selection of Jayden Daniels over Drake Maye in 2024, the primary criticism of the Styles pick was that it wasn’t the Caleb Downs pick. Yet, even those who preferred Downs seemed to feel that there was no ‘wrong answer’ in picking between the two. If anything, fans seemed to be more prepared to live with the GM’s choice this year, whatever it turned out to be, than in 2024 when passionate fans seemed to have deeper feelings about the choice between Daniels and Maye.
The next pick, that of wide receiver Antonio Williams, was less universally welcomed. Fans expected a wide receiver to be drafted (position of need and good positional value) but the general expectation was that the team would aim for a bigger-bodied receiver rather than one like Williams, who has spent 80% of his career lined up in the slot. Commments from GM Adam Peters immediately after Williams was drafted indicate that he (AP) believes that Williams is capable of playing as a Z receiver.
I saw more praise than criticism for the selections of edge rusher Joshua Josephs and running back Kaytron ‘Fatman’ Allen. The praise for these picks tended to center around value vs. consensus, while the criticism tended to focus on better players being available or individual opinion being different from the consensus board.
Fans who put a high priority on drafting for need were hoping to see the center position get filled with the Commanders’ 5th round pick. Instead, Adam Peters waited until the team’s second pick of the 6th round, thus, letting Jager Burton, Brian Parker II, and Pat Coogan to go to other teams before Washington took Matt Gulbin with the 209th pick in the draft. Like all drafted players, Gulbin played very well in college, but there are questions about his floor and ceiling in the NFL. He did rate highly on the value vs consensus criterion, with a consensus rank about 50 spots higher than the actual draft pick used to select him.
Perhaps the pick that had the most people scratching their heads was the final pick — Washington’s 7th rounder — used to take a quarterback, Athan Kaliakmanis, who will be given the opportunity to unseat current 3rd-string QB Sam Hartman. Mel Kiper Jr. described the Washington Commanders’ selection of Rutgers quarterback Athan Kaliakmanis in the 2026 NFL Draft as “a little off the wall”. Kiper indicated that Kaliakmanis, who was QB19 on his board, was not necessarily the best available quarterback at that point in the seventh round (No. 223 overall), noting that Garrett Nussmeier was still available. This shows Kiper’s faith in his evaluation of Nussmeier, who had reported medical issues involving his back and possible surgery, as well as a possible lack of understanding of the Commanders’ need to upgrade from Hartman, who was not given a chance to play in 2025 despite injuries to both starting QB Jayden Daniels and his backup Marcus Mariota. Other critics may have simply felt that there were bigger roster needs (CB, S, K) or better players available.