{"id":793876,"date":"2026-03-05T14:11:14","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T14:11:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/793876\/"},"modified":"2026-03-05T14:11:14","modified_gmt":"2026-03-05T14:11:14","slug":"five-other-takeaways-from-the-book-and-how-analytics-affect-college-football","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/793876\/","title":{"rendered":"Five other takeaways from \u2018the book\u2019 and how analytics affect college football"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The analytics movement has brought a change in strategy for when to try for a 2-point conversion in one specific situation. The idea is modern, grounded in analytics \u2026 and was used back in 1969 by Texas coach Darrell K. Royal.<\/p>\n<p>The strategy: When you\u2019re trailing by 14 points late (enough) in a game, and score a touchdown, you should go for 2 points, rather than kick an extra point.<\/p>\n<p>The theory: 2-point conversions are generally a 50 percent chance. So even if you don\u2019t get it the first time, you could make up for it the second time and tie the game. If you make the first 2-point conversion, you can win the game with the second touchdown and extra point. But if you go with the conventional wisdom and kick the extra point both times, then you\u2019re going to overtime, which is also around a 50-50 shot.<\/p>\n<p>Going for 2 is not only aggressive, but it\u2019s smart. At least that goes the newfound analytical thinking that coaches are following, confusing those used to the traditional \u2014 and seemingly safe \u2014 strategy. They may be surprised to know it\u2019s not actually that new.<\/p>\n<p>Royal was trailing Arkansas 14-0 in the fourth quarter of a No. 1 vs. No. 2 showdown in 1969. When the Longhorns scored, Royal went for 2, and got it. Then the Longhorns scored again and won 15-14.<\/p>\n<p>This was called the game of the century. President Richard Nixon was there, sitting with then-Texas Congressman George H.W. Bush. And yet Royal\u2019s strategy was overlooked. It\u2019s becoming more en vogue now, one of the influences of analytics and \u201cthe book,\u201d the game management guide that more than 100 FBS programs now utilize.\u00a0 Houston coach Willie Fritz recalled a meeting with the book\u2019s authors, Championship Analytics Inc., in which they showed a tape of a coach not doing it in another long-ago big game: The 1984 Orange Bowl, the de facto national championship. Nebraska was trailing Miami 31-17, scored a touchdown, kicked the extra point, then scored again and Tom Osborne went for 2 and the win, because there was no overtime. He failed.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIt works for older coaches like me, because we remember it,\u201d Fritz said.<\/p>\n<p>The fact Royal did what analytics now say was the right move underscores their point: It\u2019s not so much new-age thinking as it is logic.<\/p>\n<p>Here are a few other strategies, some situational and some big-picture, that coaches and analysts say don\u2019t get enough attention:<\/p>\n<p>The law of diminishing possessions<\/p>\n<p>When you\u2019re losing in the second half, you need to take more risks rather than rely on field position. Say you\u2019re down 10 with around five minutes left in the third quarter, and facing fourth down. A punt means you probably only have two or three possessions left.<\/p>\n<p>That doesn\u2019t mean you should go for it every time. But you should go for it more than the traditional thinking says. The book includes a chart that recommends what teams should do based on the score, time remaining, field position and distance to go.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe part that\u2019s maybe lost is the amount of possessions that really exist in a football game,\u201d Oregon coach Dan Lanning said. \u201cAnd be able to wrap your head around how many more possessions might you have, and that\u2019s going to affect your aggression a little bit. You know you\u2019re most likely only get the ball three more possessions, you know you need two scores, that\u2019s going to make you more aggressive.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The \u2018sum positive\u2019 of going for it<\/p>\n<p>In 2015, the first year Fritz used the book, his Georgia Southern team began 0-for-7 on fourth downs. Rather than abandon the recommendations, he kept going and the team finished 23-for-35.<\/p>\n<p>Rob Ash, the former Montana State coach who now works for CAI, put it this way: On a fourth-and-1 from your own 34, the success rate is in the 70s (depending on the team).<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe really try to get people to understand, if you have a 75 percent chance to make a fourth-and-1, and you go for it once and miss your next fourth-and-1, you still have a 75 percent chance to make it, regardless of what happened the first time,\u201d Ash said.<\/p>\n<p>Plus, Ash said the data shows that the sum positive of the 75 percent of the drives that are extended is greater than the negative derived from the 25 percent of the time you fail.<\/p>\n<p>Army coach Jeff Monken said he\u2019s found that to be the case. He\u2019s gone for it three times on fourth-and-1 from around his own 10: Twice, Army made it. The time it didn\u2019t, its defense got a stop and the other team missed a field goal.<\/p>\n<p>When field goals are good \u2026<\/p>\n<p>The book generally makes teams more aggressive, but not always. That\u2019s why Marcus Freeman, criticized for a decision in the 2025 national championship, still made the right move in the eyes of analytics.<\/p>\n<p>Notre Dame was trailing by 16 with 9:27 left in the game against Ohio State. Facing fourth-and-goal from the 9, Freeman opted for the field goal. The Irish missed. When Notre Dame later scored a touchdown, adding a 2-point conversion to make it an 8-point game, the decision looked even worse.<\/p>\n<p>But \u201cin the eyes of analytics,\u201d an 8-point game is not a one-possession game, Ash said, and a 16-point game is not a two-possession game, because of the odds of winning the game. The chances of getting two touchdowns and 2-point conversions, then winning in overtime, are under 10 percent.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIt was easily the right decision,\u201d Ash said. \u201cBut everyone looked at that 16-point game as a two-possession game, and he was in the red zone, and said man he\u2019s got to go for this.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>When field goals are bad \u2026<\/p>\n<p>Psychology matters. This gets to an example Fritz used for why he signed on to CAI.<\/p>\n<p>In 2014, Fritz\u2019s Georgia Southern team led NC State 20-17 in the final minutes and kicked a chip-shot field goal on short yardage, only to see the Wolfpack answer with a game-winning touchdown.<\/p>\n<p>When you\u2019re up 3 in the final minutes and have fourth-and-short, the analytics will always say go for it. A field goal would make it a 6-point game, and the other team, knowing it needs a touchdown, will be more aggressive and thus has a better chance of getting a touchdown, as N.C. State did.<\/p>\n<p>If you go for it, you may get it, going up 10, or could at least extend the drive. Or you fail, and it\u2019s still a 3-point lead, but the other team plays it less aggressively, knowing it can get to overtime with a field goal.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe analytics creates a situation there that changes your opponent\u2019s approach to the game,\u201d Ash said.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The analytics movement has brought a change in strategy for when to try for a 2-point conversion in&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":793877,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[21191,331,7,5042,49,48,575],"class_list":{"0":"post-793876","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ncaa-football","8":"tag-army-black-knights","9":"tag-college-football","10":"tag-football","11":"tag-houston-cougars","12":"tag-ncaa","13":"tag-ncaa-football","14":"tag-oregon-ducks"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/channels.im\/@nfl\/116176980761160736","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/793876","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=793876"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/793876\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/793877"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=793876"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=793876"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.rawchili.com\/nfl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=793876"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}